

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

JOSHUA WILLIAM JACKSON  
(BOP Register No. 54191-177),

Plaintiff,

V.

ALLISON M. SCHAEFER, ET AL.,

Defendants.

§  
§  
§  
§  
§  
§  
§  
§  
§

No. 3:18-cv-310-D-BN

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

This *pro se* civil rights action has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from United States District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater. The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, for the reasons stated below, the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

**Applicable Background**

Plaintiff Joshua William Jackson, a federal prisoner, filed this action against two federal agents, three federal agencies, and the Wichita Falls Police Department concerning the execution of a search warrant at his home in April 2016, *see* Dkt. No. 3, through which he seeks monetary relief for alleged property damage and “unnecessary pain and suffering,” *id.* The day after this action was filed, the Court entered a Notice of Deficiency and Order (the “NOD”) that cautioned Jackson that

[t]he complaint [he] filed ... is not signed as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a). Accordingly, Jackson must file an amended complaint that includes his signature by **March 12, 2018**. While resubmitting a signed version of the original complaint would remedy this deficiency, the Court WARNS Jackson that, as currently pleaded, his claims against several defendants are subject to summary dismissal.

A plaintiff may not bring a civil action against a servient political agency or department unless that agency or department enjoys a separate and distinct legal existence. *See Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't*, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991). In *Darby*, the Fifth Circuit held that, “unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government itself.” *Id.* at 313. For example, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the police departments of Texas municipalities are not jural entities subject to suit. *See, e.g., Hagwood v. Dallas Police Dep't*, No. 3:15-cv-2622-L-BN, 2015 WL 6688721, at \*3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2015), *rec. accepted*, 2015 WL 6690045 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2015).

“The United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit, meaning it cannot be sued without consent.” *Gonzalez v. United States*, 851 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a “[a] plaintiff may only sue the United States if a federal statute explicitly provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity.” *In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig. (Miss. Plaintiffs)*, 668 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2012). And the sovereign immunity of the United States extends to its agencies. *See FDIC v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”).

Further, the Court will not screen Jackson’s amended complaint, should one be filed, until either (1) the full filing fee (\$400.00) is received or (2) he files a proper motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* (“IFP”) and attaches to that motion a certificate of inmate trust account.

To remedy this deficiency, attached to this order is a form application to proceed IFP – prisoner. And it is hereby ORDERED that Jackson must (if he qualifies to proceed IFP) complete and file an IFP motion no later than **March 12, 2018**. But if the Court receives the full filing fee before that time, Jackson may disregard this portion of the order, and the Court will screen his claims as presented in a signed, amended complaint.

Failure to file a signed complaint and/or failure to either pay the filing fee or move to proceed IFP by **March 12, 2018** will result in a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for failure to prosecute. *See* FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Jackson is also CAUTIONED that, as the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (the “PLRA”) applies to this civil action, under the PLRA, “[a] prisoner proceeding IFP in the district court is obligated to pay the full filing fee upon the filing of a complaint. [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(b)(1). No relief from an order directing payment of the filing fee should be granted for a voluntary dismissal.” *Hatchet v. Nettles*, 201 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing *Williams v. Roberts*, 116 F.3d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1997); *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997)); see, e.g., *Bays v. United States*, No. 3:15-cv-1824-B-BN, 2015 WL 4930913 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2015).

Dkt. No. 4.

It is now more than one month past the deadline for Jackson to respond to the NOD – and it is more than two months since he filed this action – and Jackson has yet to comply with the Court’s order or otherwise contact the Court.

### **Legal Standards and Analysis**

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), “a district court may dismiss an action *sua sponte* if the plaintiff fails to comply with court orders.” *Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit*, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); *McCullough v. Lynaugh*, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). Under the same rule, a district court also “may *sua sponte* dismiss an action for failure to prosecute.” *Rosin v. Thaler*, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citations omitted)). That authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” *Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd.*, 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); see also *Lopez v. Ark. Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be

exercised sua sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting *Link*, 370 U.S. at 631)).

A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. *See Long v. Simmons*, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).

Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’”

*Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting *Bryson v. United States*, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting *Callip v. Harris Cty. Child Welfare Dep’t*, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); *see also Long*, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); *cf. Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that “lesser sanctions” may “include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings” (quoting *Thrasher v. City of Amarillo*, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).

By not responding to the NOD, as ordered by the Court, and thereby preventing this action from proceeding, Jackson has failed to prosecute his lawsuit and also has failed to obey a court order. A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is warranted under these circumstances. And the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile. The Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as Jackson decides to comply with the Court’s order. The Court should

therefore exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending case and *sua sponte* dismiss this action without prejudice.

### **Recommendation**

The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b).

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: April 16, 2018



---

DAVID L. HORAN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE